Linn Maung
Since Myanmar’s military coup in February 2021, India has been dealing with a smouldering issue on its northeastern border. Over 50,000 citizens have fled across the border into India’s northeast from Myanmar’s Chin State and Sagaing Region. The most recent clashes in Manipur between Kukis and Meiteis also indicate that its roots are in Myanmar.
Without a doubt, geopolitics and India’s concerns about its northern flank dictate India’s Myanmar strategy. Four of India’s eight northeast states share a border with Myanmar (approx. 1643 km), which is porous and border administration is difficult due to the topography. Aside from the border, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, and Arunachal Pradesh tribals have ethnic and family ties that extend into Myanmar’s Chin State and Sagaing Region.
Indian rebel groups have had a safe haven in Myanmar for decades, and during the coup in Myanmar, these rebel groups collaborated with the Junta to destroy the local opposition groups.The People’s Liberation Army of Manipur and the Manipur Naga People’s Front, both of which are fighting the Indian state for independence or greater autonomy, have utilised Myanmar territory as a staging ground for operations in India, including an ambush of an Assam Rifles convoy in November 2021. Although the Myanmar Army eradicated an insurgent base in Taga, Sagaing, in 2019-20, camps were relocated even more closer to Indo Myanmar border .
Due to various compulsions and several facets of India’s geopolitical rivalry with China, India has remained careful with Myanmar. China claims sections in northeast India. Myanmar is also an important node for Chinese expansion into the Indian Ocean, most notably through the pipelines and projected railroads of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor from Yunnan Province to Kyaukpyu Port. India is concerned that a weak SAC will become overly reliant on China, opening up new fronts for pressure and Chinese power projection.However, China is already using the post-coup scenario to boost its influence, guaranteeing assistance for the SAC “ no matter how the situation changes” while also increasing interaction with its EAO partners.
Since the coup, China has started a number of major infrastructure projects in Myanmar, transferred planes to the military, and signed an agreement with Yunnan Province to supply rice and fertiliser to the SAC. In April, Indian officials questioned the SAC about the possibility of Chinese intelligence installations on Myanmar’s Coco Islands, which would provide additional capabilities for monitoring naval bases and missile test sites on India’s eastern coast. SAC is unable to restrict Chinese access to Coco Island.
Despite its efforts to look uninvolved in Myanmar’s internal affairs, India maintains its pre-coup investments and economic relationships in the country. These initiatives were part of India’s Look East and Act East programmes, which aimed to expand the country’s engagement with Southeast Asia.The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, for example, is intended to extend from India down into Myanmar’s Rakhine State and the Indian Ocean. While the Indian-funded port of Sittwe has begun operations, the projected 68-mile roadway through Chin State has yet to be completed. Much of this area is in war and controlled by EAOs, and project completion will necessitate discussions with them.
According to certain watchdog organisations or western-backed non-governmental organisations, Indian corporations continue to give critical material support to the SAC, but there is no evidence of such cooperation.
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