Linn Maung
The military junta in Myanmar is facing a formidable task three years after seizing power, as several ethnic insurgent groups continue to resist throughout the nation. More than a dozen towns and land customs in Shan state have been taken over by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, an alliance of three armed rebel factions in the north supported by China. The Arakan Army is still advancing in Rakhine state in spite of a cease-fire mediated by China. China undoubtedly has a lot of power over both sides of the fight.
In the interest of stability, Beijing will keep up its influence in Myanmar, but its goal of territorial expansion will always come first. EAOs exercise caution as well, as an excessive reliance may have unfavourable effects.
Since the interim settlement that was achieved in January 2024 “ basically had few additional demands,” tensions were probably going to decrease even more, but the situation is actually more complicated now.
Public opinion would make it difficult for the EAOs to accept a permanent ceasefire arrangement with the junta, and if they stopped fighting right once and began negotiating with the military dictatorship, they would have a lot of explaining to do to the people.
Since Operation 1027, Myanmar has suffered, and both sides are serious about resuming it. It is believed that the Junta’s pledge to speed the construction of the deep sea port in Kyaukphyu last month was made in an attempt to win China over. In the meantime, China’s assets will be safeguarded by the Three Brotherhood Alliance throughout the Myanmar.
China is aware that protracted unrest may make it difficult for the country to complete its Belt and Road initiatives. China maintains “ close communication” with the military administration of Myanmar and other ethnic armed groups that operate in areas where China has previously constructed projects. This is the rationale behind this. China is aware that its Belt and Road initiatives will ultimately benefit from a just resolution to the Myanmar issue.
Beijing has declared time and time again that it will not meddle in internal matters in Myanmar. The Chinese foreign ministry declared that any attempts to sabotage the friendship between China and Myanmar “ will not succeed” in response to the pro-junta demonstrations.
Observers noted there may be some trust issues between China and the junta over the latter’s inaction in fighting cross-border fraud targeting Chinese citizens. Hundreds of thousands of Chinese are believed to have been lured to Myanmar by the promise of high-paying jobs but were instead held hostage and forced to work in operation centres.
Although China disapproves of Min Aung Hlaing’s leadership, China has also engaged with NUG, as the NUG’s New Year’s declaration made abundantly evident. NUG is dedicated to upholding the “ one China” concept, defending Chinese assets in Myanmar, and cooperating with Beijing to combat cross-border crime.
Many believe that in a few years, “ rump states,” which are marked by dispersed authority and several secession efforts, may arise if the current circumstances continue. This fragmentation probably isn’t how China would like it to be. As a matter of fact, some stakeholders have said that China is adopting a tactic similar to “ watching the fire burn from across the river.”
Many academics think that coming to an agreement to return Myanmar to the “ 2011 scenario” is the best course of action that the US and China could take. After decades of dictatorship, the junta launched a number of democratic reforms in 2011 to pave the way for the country’s transition to civilian governance, although even that is currently extremely challenging.
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