~ Linn Maung ~
In the aftermath of the 2025 Beidaihe meeting, China’s political landscape has entered a phase of quiet but unmistakable transformation. The sudden reappearance of President Xi Jinping in Tibet, following a three-week absence from public view, has reignited speculation about internal power dynamics. His visittimed to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was not merely ceremonial. It marked a symbolic assertion of authority in a region historically tied to Hu Jintao and Hu Chunhua, both of whom have long been associated with reformist and moderate factions within the Communist Party.
Xi’s arrival in Lhasa on August 20 was his first public appearance since the Beidaihe conclave, a retreat where senior leaders traditionally negotiate behind closed doors. The timing and location were significant. Tibet, often viewed as a political and ideological frontier, has been a stronghold of Hu Chunhua, once considered a rising star and heir apparent. Xi’s presence, accompanied by a high-level delegation, was interpreted as a calculated move to project unity and control amid swirling rumours of his waning influence.
The event itself was unusually grand for a 60th anniversaryneither a centennial nor a half-century milestone. Nearly 20,000 people, including officials, soldiers, and schoolchildren, participated in orchestrated celebrations. The optics resembled a North Korean-style spectacle, with red flags, choreographed dances, and tightly managed public appearances.
Perhaps more surprising than Xi’s reappearance was the inclusion of Hu Chunhua in the central delegation. Once side-lined and demoted to a ceremonial role in the CPPCC, Hu’s return to Tibetwhere he previously served as Party Secretary,was seen as a symbolic homecoming and a potential signal of rehabilitation. His presence alongside Xi suggests a recalibration of alliances, possibly reflecting a compromise reached during Beidaihe.
According to multiple sources, Hu’s re-emergence may be part of a broader consensus among party elders to restore balance within the leadership. His fluency in Tibetan and longstanding ties to the region lend credibility to his role in future governance, especially if the party seeks to soften its image and reintroduce moderate voices.
Coinciding with these developments, the PLA Daily published an article reaffirming Xi as the “core leader” of the Party, a notable shift after months of avoiding such language. This rhetorical pivot appears designed to reinforce stability and continuity, even as internal military purges continue to destabilize the Central Military Commission (CMC).
The CMC has been rocked by the disappearance and removal of key figures. Defence Minister Li Shangfu, Political Work Department Chief Miao Hua, and Vice Chairman He Weidong have all fallen from grace, leaving three seats vacant. In response, General Zhang Youxia,Xi’s longtime ally and military strategisthas reportedly orchestrated a new leadership lineup. Liu Yuan, son of former President Liu Shaoqi, has been invited back as acting vice chairman overseeing political affairs. General Kai Ying is believed to be serving as acting chief of general staff, while General Wang Guanzhong heads the political work department.
Ahead of the September 3 military parade, Zhang redeployed the Second Group Armyhis loyalist unitto replace the First Group Army in Beijing, a move interpreted by some as a security measure and by others as a veiled show of force. Over 40,000 troops and heavy equipment were mobilized, creating an atmosphere of tension and uncertainty.
Exiled scholar Wu Zuoli reports that the recent Beidaihe meeting yielded a four-point consensus aimed at recalibrating power within the Chinese Communist Party. Xi Jinping would remain in office to preserve social stability, but personality cult propaganda would be curbed. A constitutional amendment would reinstate the two-term limit, barring Xi from extending his rule. The Party, government, and military would function with greater autonomy, reducing the General Secretary’s direct control. Finally, a central body would guide preparations for the Fourth Plenum and the 21st Party Congress. These shifts, including Li Gang’s replacement, signal a quiet transition toward new leadership.
On August 20, other top leaders were notably engaged in separate activities. Premier Li Qiang toured Beijing’s biopharmaceutical sector, Vice President Han Zheng met with Denmark’s Novo Nordisk chairman, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks with Afghan officials. Only Zhang Youxia remained absent from public view, further fuelling speculation about behind-the-scenes manoeuvring.
Meanwhile, Liu Yuan’s alleged call for Xi to resign and his endorsement of Wang Yang as successor has sent shockwaves through the political establishment. If true, this marks a rare public challenge from within the princeling faction, traditionally loyal to the Party’s core.
The reappearance of party eldersWen Jiabao, Li Ruihuan, Hu Jintao, and Jiang Zeminadds another layer of complexity. Their involvement suggests a coordinated effort to guide the transition and prevent factional collapse. Online speculation has even invoked the ancient prophecy of “Tui Bei Tu,” with netizens joking that Zhang Youxia fits the image of the “substitute soldier,” while Liu Yuan represents the “golden sword.”
Whether Xi will step down as anticipated remains uncertain. But the convergence of symbolic gestures, military reshuffling, and elite reconfigurations points to a silent revolution already underway.The answer, as ever in Chinese politics, lies aheadhidden in plain sight.
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjr19770x7lo
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/8/21/xi-jinping-makes-rare-visit-to-tibet-as-60-years-of-chinese-rule-celebrated
https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/xi-on-the-roof-of-the-world-chinas-grip-on-tibet-holds-firm-13927490.html
https://apnews.com/article/china-tibet-xi-jinping-visit-lhasa-8bf015c599a9cc17c5c25e8f69a32d78
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