~ Linn Maung ~
Myanmar’s Deputy Junta chief, Soe Win’s recent announcement regarding a review and possible implementation of the long-suspended, China-backed Myitsone hydropower project has reignited an intense debate within Myanmar and beyond. The controversial project, shelved since 2011, has once again come under scrutiny due to its environmental, social, and seismic risks. Many observers see this move as a calculated attempt by the military junta to placate Beijing in return for Chinese support—particularly in persuading ethnic armed groups to agree to ceasefires and stabilise conflict-hit regions.
Experts attribute the renewed push to sustained pressure from China, which views the suspension of the US$3.6-billion Myitsone Dam as a major diplomatic and strategic setback. China, known for using pressure tactics to safeguard its overseas infrastructure interests by hook or crook, has never fully accepted the project’s suspension. Since the decision taken by the then junta-backed civilian government in 2011, Beijing has continuously sought ways to revive the dam.
The project was halted amid widespread fears of environmental destruction, displacement of thousands of local residents, and risks arising from seismic activity and flooding. Despite these concerns, Deputy junta chief Soe Win recently assured that the dam would be built as a concrete-faced rock-fill structure capable of withstanding powerful earthquakes, even though the site lies just 25.4 kilometres from the highly active Sagaing Fault. Such assurances are unlikely to calm critics.
China and the Myitsone Dam Debacle
Fourteen years after the suspension, the diplomatic embarrassment caused by Myitsone remains fresh in the minds of Chinese leaders. The setback actually forced China to confront a difficult question: how could it continue expanding its hydropower footprint abroad without provoking political backlash, reputational damage and financial losses? In response, Beijing introduced policy changes aimed at tightening oversight of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) operating overseas. These reforms emphasised risk assessment, corporate social responsibility, and improved due diligence.
Yet, while procedural safeguards increased, the fundamental incentives driving China’s overseas hydropower expansion remained unchanged. Hydropower continues to be a core pillar of China’s foreign economic strategy, and SOEs are still encouraged to secure contracts that enhance Beijing’s regional and strategic influence. The lesson from Myitsone was not to retreat, but to move more carefully—without abandoning ambition.
Consequently, China continued to pursue the revival of the Myitsone project with successive governments in Myanmar, both democratic and military. Having realised that the current military junta is particularly vulnerable-politically, economically and diplomatically, China intensified its pressure, especially with elections round the corner.
Myitsone Dam and Local Communities
Local opposition to the Myitsone Dam remains overwhelming. On September 30, marking the 14th anniversary of the project’s suspension under President U Thein Sein, residents once again called for its permanent cancellation. Community leaders stressed that preserving the sustainability and ecological integrity of the Myitsone region is crucial for Myanmar’s future.
The Myitsone area lies about 28 miles north of Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin State, at the confluence of the N’mai Kha and Mali Kha rivers, which together form the Ayeyarwady River—Myanmar’s most important lifeline.
Although construction remains officially suspended, locals fear that political instability could be exploited by China to quietly restart the project. Old reports indicate that when the dam was initially launched, villagers from Tanghpe were forcibly evicted and relocated to Aungmyinthar and Maliyang villages. These displaced communities continue to demand the right to return to their ancestral lands.
Despite the halt, residents are still barred from returning. Herders are denied access, while gold mining operations have reportedly taken over the area, causing further environmental degradation. In 2024, junta-appointed Kachin State Chief Minister U Khet Htein Nan confirmed that China had proposed reviving the dam at a reduced height—an apparent attempt to soften opposition without addressing core concerns.
Why Does China Pressurise Myanmar?
The Myitsone project was designed to transmit the vast majority of its electricity to China, not Myanmar. For Beijing, the project would provide energy security, strategic leverage, and regional influence.
Hydropower is central to China’s energy strategy as it seeks carbon neutrality by 2060. With a domestic installed capacity of around 350 million kilowatts, Chinese firms dominate over 70 percent of the global overseas hydropower construction market and have participated in more than 320 projects worldwide.
Infrastructure diplomacy remains a powerful tool for China to deploy excess capital, strengthen geopolitical influence, and lock neighbouring countries into long-term dependence.
Background of the Myitsone Hydropower Project
The Myitsone Dam is part of the larger Confluence Region Hydropower Project (CRHP), comprising seven dams with a combined installed capacity of 20,000 MW—accounting for 41 percent of the hydropower capacity proposed under Myanmar’s 30-year strategic energy plan.
Initiated in 2001, the project involved a joint venture between Myanmar’s government, China Power Investment Corporation (CPI Group), and Asia World Group. CPI was to finance most of the US$3.6 billion cost. Under the agreement, Myanmar would receive just 10 percent of the electricity generated, while China would take 90 percent. Full ownership would transfer to Myanmar only after 50 years.
Opposition grew steadily as political leaders, environmentalists, and civil society groups warned of massive ecological and social costs. The dam was expected to flood 447 square kilometres, displacing 47 villages and nearly 11,800 residents. Critics argued it would permanently alter river flows, damage soil fertility downstream, and erase cultural and historical sites vital to the Kachin people.
In September 2011, responding to mounting public pressure, President Thein Sein had suspended the project. Although China withdrew its construction teams in 2013, it has never stopped lobbying for its revival. The return of military rule in February 2021 created new opportunities.
Experts said that China’s relentless push to revive the dam demonstrates that while it may adjust tactics, its strategic ambitions remain unchanged. Beijing is willing to exploit political instability, authoritarian dependence, and economic vulnerability to advance its interests, even at the cost of local communities and ecological security.
China’s dam diplomacy could set a dangerous precedent—not only for Myanmar but for other fragile states across Asia. It is imperative that the United States, regional powers, and global institutions remain vigilant, support affected communities, and prevent China from exploiting Myanmar in the name of `dam’ development.
1: https://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2025/07/damming-the-river-by-feeling-the-stones-chinas-mekong-hydropower-strategy/
2: https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/locals-call-permanent-halt-myitsone-dam-project
3: https://saiscsr.org/2021/04/29/csr-blog-a-tale-of-two-dams-in-southeast-asia/
#MeKongNews
