Linn Maung
Governance flaws by the junta endanger China’s national security and are increasingly leading to transnational criminal issues. The 2021 military coup in Myanmar not only sparked an unprecedented mass movement against military power, but it is also posing new threats to global security. The junta’s ineffective control has resulted in an increase in cross-border human trafficking and computer scams, which have impacted practically every corner of the globe, inflicting a particularly severe toll on Chinese citizens while enriching organised Chinese crime organisations. Beijing’s reaction to the situation in Myanmar has been erratic. While assisting the regime, China has also funded some of Myanmar’s most prominent ethnic armed organisations, thereby strengthening Chinese influence in the country.
Beijing is very concerned about the rise in crime, but its campaign has done more to boost Chinese security influence in Myanmar than to impede the powerful Chinese crime syndicates that are now thoroughly ingrained in the country. The international community must take more seriously the lawlessness and its worldwide ramifications that have extended to the regions around Myanmar’s borders with Thailand and China. And how China handles it will have a huge impact on Myanmar’s conflict and the capacity of Myanmar-based criminal gangs to continue their unlawful activities.
Myanmar’s military leaders are aware that they want Chinese assistance and are concerned about China’s hedging strategy. For months, coup leader Min Aung Hlaing has attempted to gain further Chinese backing by obtaining an invitation to visit China. According to sources within his own administration, the military leader has offered to revive extremely controversial hydropower projects in Kachin State, which have been stalled since 2011, in exchange for a visit to Beijing. In a same spirit, the junta reacted to Chinese requests in early June to provide the security required to resume operations at a very controversial Chinese copper mine in the Sagaing region, displacing roughly 5,000 people.
Since the end of last year, Beijing has exhibited a stronger commitment to engagement and cooperation with the junta, including strong political support for the military. During his May visit to Myanmar, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang stated that the Chinese government will improve relations with “ all departments” of the military authority. Meanwhile, Beijing has become further distant from the regime’s main adversaries. China ended its public interaction with the previous ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) in October 2021.
By early 2023, it had begun pressuring the country’s most powerful ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) to reach an agreement with the army and reduce its dealings with the opposition National Unity Government and the many other players in the continuing spring revolution. Local governments and Chinese firms in China’s Yunnan Province, where economic growth is heavily reliant on connectivity to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar, have taken even bolder moves to work with the military administration. The Yunnan government has organised discussions and facilitated new business partnerships and investments with junta ministries and affiliated firms.
To summarise, the Chinese government has expressed a strong desire to work with Myanmar’s military administration to guarantee Beijing’s economic interests, expand economic, cultural, and political ties, and neutralise Western support for democracy in the nation. Even so, Beijing might take a number of other ways to bolster the military’s power against the enormous numbers of the country’s EAOs, People’s Defence Forces, and the millions of Myanmar people who refuse to surrender to military rule. It might, for example, curtail commerce with powerful EAOs along the border and limit their access to Chinese telecommunications, banking, and finance systems. However, China will never do so because the EAOs areas in northern Myanmar are resourceful, with mineral deposits and hydro potential. Moreover the proposed railway corridoor linking China with Indian Ocean passes mainly through Ethnic regions.
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