~ Linn Maung ~
For much of the last two decades, Beijing appeared to operate on a fairly stable assumption about Japan. Tokyo, despite periodic diplomatic friction, would remain fundamentally cautious; economically tied to China, domestically constrained by its postwar political culture, and reluctant to move too far beyond the boundaries of its pacifist security posture. That assumption is now clearly fading due to China’s own aggressive posture.
The deterioration in China-Japan relations over the past year has not emerged from a single crisis. It is the cumulative result of economic coercion, military signalling and sustained pressure around Taiwan and the East China Sea. Beijing’s intention may have been to discourage Japan from aligning more openly against Chinese interests, yet in practice, it has accelerated precisely the strategic transformation China has long feared.
The shift became unmistakable after Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in late 2025 that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute an “existential threat” to Japan under Tokyo’s security legislation leading to sharp reactions from Beijing. Diplomatic protests were followed by restrictions on Japanese seafood imports, pressure on tourism and cultural exchanges and eventually controls on exports of dual use materials and rare earth related products.
Japan’s defence posture today is changing at a pace that would have been politically difficult to imagine even five years ago. Tokyo approved a record defence budget exceeding 9 trillion yen for fiscal year 2026, continuing its plan to raise defence spending to 2 percent of GDP. The budget includes investments in long range strike capabilities, unmanned systems, missile defence, and military infrastructure across Japan’s southwestern islands. The government has also accelerated joint development of next generation fighter aircraft with Britain and Italy while loosening decades old restrictions on arms exports.
This is not simply a reaction to abstract concerns about regional instability. Chinese actions have steadily strengthened the domestic political case for military normalization inside Japan. Chinese naval and air activity around Okinawa, the Miyako Strait, and the Senkaku Islands has become more frequent and more assertive. Joint patrols involving Chinese and Russian bombers near Japanese airspace reinforced a perception within Tokyo that the regional balance is becoming structurally less stable. These operations may be intended as demonstrations of deterrence, but they also serve the function of providing Japanese policymakers with continuous evidence to justify institutional and doctrinal change.
Even the rhetoric surrounding Japan has become counterproductive for Beijing. At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi publicly rejected Chinese accusations of “new militarism,” arguing instead that China’s rapid military buildup and opaque strategic behaviour were driving insecurity across the region. The exchange itself mattered less than what it reflected. Japan no longer framed its defence expansion apologetically. It increasingly frames it as a rational response to China’s conduct.
The economic dimension too tells us a similar story. China’s use of rare earths and critical minerals as leverage has revived memories of the 2010 Senkaku dispute, when Beijing similarly restricted exports to Japan. This time, restrictions on dysprosium, terbium, yttrium oxide, and gallium have again exposed Japan’s dependence on Chinese supply chains.
In the short term, these restrictions are disruptive. Japanese firms remain deeply reliant on Chinese processing capacity for several strategic materials used in semiconductors, defence systems, and high-end manufacturing. But the broader geopolitical effect may again run against Beijing’s interests.
Since the 2010 dispute, Tokyo has invested heavily in diversification strategies, stockpiling, and partnerships with suppliers such as Australia. The current restrictions are likely to accelerate that process rather than reverse it. Recent Japan-Australia agreements on critical minerals cooperation and supply chain resilience point directly in that direction.
Similarly, Tokyo has deepened defence cooperation not only with the United States, but also with Australia, the Philippines and several Southeast Asian states. This week, Japan and the Philippines moved toward an information sharing agreement designed to facilitate Japanese military equipment transfers to Manila. Such arrangements would have faced far greater political resistance in an earlier era. China’s regional behaviour has reduced that resistance considerably.
This does not mean Japan’s transformation is solely a product of Beijing’s policies. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reshaped strategic thinking across much of the Indo-Pacific. American pressure for allied burden sharing also remains an important factor. Domestic political evolution within Japan matters as well, particularly among younger policymakers less psychologically bound by the postwar era. But China has made these transitions easier politically as well as strategically.
That is the central contradiction in Beijing’s current approach. Chinese officials routinely warn against Japanese “remilitarization,” yet many of the policies pursued by Beijing are actively strengthening support for exactly that outcome.
None of this suggests that Japan is abandoning caution altogether. Tokyo still remains economically intertwined with China, and Japanese policymakers continue to avoid openly confrontational rhetoric where possible. There are also clear limits to how far Japan’s electorate is prepared to go on questions such as constitutional revision or direct military involvement in a Taiwan contingency.
China’s strategy toward Japan appears designed to deter alignment against Beijing. Instead, it is steadily producing deeper military coordination, faster defence normalization, stronger supply chain diversification and wider regional security partnerships centred on balancing Chinese power. The uncomfortable reality for Beijing may be that its own pressure campaign has become one of the strongest political arguments for Japan’s strategic transformation.
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