~ Linn Maung ~

The identity crisis in Hong Kong has intensified to a critical point, with recent incidents abroad and at home reflecting the growing rejection of Beijing’s imposed identity. A viral video showed a Hong Kong journalist confronted by a young pro-Beijing supporter, often referred to as a “Little Pink.” The journalist avoided direct discussion of independence but insisted on identifying as a Hongkonger rather than Chinese. Similar confrontations have been reported on Hong Kong’s streets, where residents clash with pro-CCP supporters who argue that official identification documents prove Chinese nationality. These exchanges highlight the widening psychological and cultural divide between Hongkongers and mainlanders, a divide exacerbated by Beijing’s policies.

This divide recalls the mass protests of 2019 against the extradition bill, which drew millions of participants. By late 2022, more than 10,000 demonstrators had been arrested, marking the territory’s most severe political crisis since its establishment. The introduction of the National Security Law in 2020 further entrenched Beijing’s control, criminalizing dissent and silencing opposition. International responses included the United States revoking Hong Kong’s special trade status and passing the Hong Kong Autonomy Act. The crackdown prompted a large-scale exodus, with nearly 300,000 Hongkongers leaving. By March 2025, the UK had approved over 179,000 BNO visa applications, with around 163,000 arrivals, while others sought refuge in countries such as Australia. Exiled activists have emphasized that leaving is not migration but resistance, urging the world not to forget those still imprisoned, including figures like Jimmy Lai of Next Digital.

Beijing’s strategy has extended beyond arrests and emigration, focusing heavily on education. In 2023, China’s legislature passed the Patriotic Education Law, mandating its implementation in Hong Kong and Macau. By 2024, local textbooks included Xi Jinping Thought, and students were criticized for singing the national anthem too softly. That same year, Beijing inaugurated its first patriotic education base for Hong Kong and Macau youth, presenting it as part of Xi’s vision. Scholars have warned that patriotism in this context equates to loyalty to the Party rather than love for the people, raising concerns about ideological indoctrination and the erosion of local identity.

Cultural tensions have also deepened. Reports and videos show mainland tourists clashing with Hong Kong’s civic norms, from blocking tram aisles and refusing bus fares to berating workers. One incident involved a stroller being thrown after bus entry was denied, while another saw threats of financial ruin directed at a sanitation worker. Economic dependence has added to these strains, as seen in the scandal involving a mainland supplier contracted to provide bottled water later found to contain unsafe bromate levels. The contract was terminated, and arrests followed, but the episode reinforced fears about reliance on mainland companies.

In response, Hongkongers have adopted what is described as “soft resistance.” Civil servants discreetly order local products instead of mainland brands, while cultural expressions such as book fairs, song lyrics, and Western holidays are treated as subtle acts of defiance. Officials warn that such resistance could justify further crackdowns, but analysts argue it reflects a determination to preserve identity under increasing pressure.

Labour and demographic changes reveal another dimension of Beijing’s strategy. Mainland workers, often accepting lower wages and longer hours, have displaced locals in industries such as construction and restaurants. By mid-2025, unemployment reached 3.7 percent, the highest in three years, with some sectors exceeding 6 percent. Rising rents have compounded economic struggles. At the same time, visitor numbers show a dramatic demographic shift: in July 2025, Hong Kong received 4.44 million visitors, 76 percent from mainland China. In the first seven months of the year, 21.3 million arrivals from China far outnumbered 6.7 million overseas tourists. Talent import schemes also reveal that over 94 percent of approvals come from China, raising concerns of a quiet population reset similar to strategies used in Xinjiang.

Observers argue that Hong Kong is being used as a testing ground for broader ambitions. In 2022, China’s ambassador to France stated that Taiwanese people would undergo “re-education” after reunification. Scholars in Taiwan have warned that Beijing is already using cultural exchanges to draw teachers and students to the mainland, embedding ideological influence. Hong Kong’s experience demonstrates how repression can be exported, with implications for Taiwan and other democracies if resistance falters.

Despite these pressures, Hongkongers continue to resist. Through protests, exile, and subtle defiance, they assert their identity and reject Beijing’s legitimacy. The declaration “I’m not Chinese, I’m a Hongkonger” has become more than a slogan; it represents survival against authoritarian assimilation. The struggle in Hong Kong is not confined to the territoryit is a frontline battle against the global expansion of authoritarianism.

Source :

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/hong-kong-high-court-tiananmen-vigil-trial-5442046

https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2025-11-05/china-pins-hopes-on-olympic-star-for-high-quality-hong-kong-democracy

https://ipdefenseforum.com/2025/05/u-s-sanctions-ccp-hong-kong-officials-over-transnational-repression/

https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown

https://time.com/7294510/hong-kong-national-security-china-democratic-crackdown-distracted-us-trump/

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