~ Linn Maung ~
The formal removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli from China’s state Central Military Commission (CMC) marks a significant new stage in Xi Jinping’s transformation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Their downfall should not, however, be understood simply as another episode in Xi’s long-running anti-corruption campaign or as a straightforward exercise in personal power consolidation.
The removal of China’s most senior uniformed officer and its chief operational commander points to a deeper tension at the heart of Xi’s military ambitions; the effort to build a force that is simultaneously more politically loyal, more centrally controlled and more capable of fighting and winning a modern war.
In practice, the scale and persistence of the military purges increasingly suggest a gap between political control and institutional effectiveness. Zhang Youxia was the CMC’s senior vice-chairman and the highest-ranking uniformed officer in the PLA before he was placed under investigation in January. Liu Zhenli, meanwhile, headed the CMC’s Joint Staff Department, placing him at the centre of China’s operational command system. Their formal removal from the state CMC on August 28 has reduced the body, which began its current term with seven members, to just Xi Jinping and CMC Vice-Chairman Zhang Shengmin as active members.
This is an extraordinary depletion of China’s highest military leadership. More importantly, it raises a question that extends beyond the fate of two generals; why, after more than a decade of unprecedented centralisation and political control, does Xi Jinping continue to find serious disciplinary and institutional problems at the highest levels of the military?
The answer is vital not only for understanding Chinese elite politics, but also for assessing the PLA’s trajectory as Beijing approaches the military’s 2027 centenary modernisation goals.
The Paradox of Greater Control and Persistent Institutional Weakness
Since taking power, Xi Jinping has undertaken the most extensive restructuring of the PLA in decades. His reforms dismantled the old military region system, strengthened the authority of the CMC, reorganised the command structure and placed greater emphasis on joint operations. At the political level, these reforms were anchored in the principle of the CMC Chairman Responsibility System, which concentrates ultimate military authority in Xi’s hands.
The political rationale behind this centralisation is deeply rooted in the Chinese Communist Party’s understanding of regime security. For the Party, control over the military is not merely a matter of national defence. The PLA is the Party’s army, and ensuring its political loyalty remains fundamental to the CCP’s survival.
Xi’s reforms have therefore sought to address two related problems: modernising the PLA for future warfare while ensuring that the military remains firmly subordinate to the Party leadership. Yet the recent purges demonstrate the limits of equating centralisation with institutional control.
Zhang Youxia’s downfall is particularly important in this respect. He was not an obvious remnant of an earlier political order or a peripheral military figure whose removal could be explained through factional realignment. As the senior vice-chairman of the CMC, he occupied the highest position in the uniformed military hierarchy. His removal therefore suggests that political proximity to the leadership and seniority within Xi’s military system have not insulated even the most powerful commanders from investigation.
Since the military anti-corruption campaign intensified in 2023, investigations have reached critical parts of the PLA, including the Rocket Force, the military procurement and equipment system, political work structures and the Joint Staff Department. A recent assessment based on Chinese official reporting and personnel changes noted that 26 full generals had been placed under investigation since 2023, while another 12 had disappeared from public view. The breadth of this campaign points towards a structural problem rather than merely the elimination of a single political network.
The PLA is undergoing rapid technological and organisational transformation while remaining embedded within a Leninist political system in which political reliability, ideological conformity and Party control remain central to professional advancement. This creates a difficult institutional environment. The same highly personalised structures through which political control is maintained can also encourage patronage networks and distort professional incentives.
A Thinning High Command and the Challenge of Military Effectiveness
The removal of Zhang and Liu also raises more immediate questions about the PLA’s command structure and institutional capacity. Modern warfare depends on experienced leadership, trusted chains of command and the ability to coordinate complex operations across multiple military services. Xi’s reforms have sought to make the PLA more capable of precisely such joint operations. Repeated purges, however, can disrupt the accumulation of senior-level expertise.
The removal of top commanders creates immediate personnel gaps and forces the leadership to identify replacements who are professionally competent, politically reliable and personally trusted by the Party leadership. These requirements do not always overlap. The challenge becomes more acute when a substantial portion of the senior officer corps has been investigated, dismissed or subjected to political uncertainty.
China is already confronting a shortage of recent combat experience within its senior military leadership. The PLA has not fought a major war since the conflict with Vietnam in 1979. Zhang and Liu belonged to a relatively small generation of senior Chinese commanders with direct experience of the Sino-Vietnamese conflicts. Their departure therefore further reduces the presence of combat-experienced officers at the highest levels of the military hierarchy.
The consequences of the purge are particularly important because Xi has placed increasing emphasis on military readiness and the PLA’s ability to undertake increasingly complex missions. China’s expanding strategic interests require the PLA to operate across the Indo-Pacific, protect overseas interests and develop credible capabilities for a potential contingency involving Taiwan.
The continued focus on corruption within military procurement illustrates this problem. Beijing’s recent decision to solicit public reports of procurement violations within the Rocket Force demonstrates that concerns about corruption remain active even after several years of investigations. The campaign covers multiple aspects of procurement, including planning, bid evaluation and contract execution. Such problems have direct implications for military capability. Corruption in procurement is not merely a political or financial issue. It can affect equipment quality, maintenance, logistics and the reliability of systems that appear impressive on paper. For a military preparing for technologically sophisticated warfare, these weaknesses can have serious consequences.
This may also explain why Xi appears willing to accept the disruption caused by repeated purges. From Beijing’s perspective, a compromised command and procurement system may pose a greater long-term threat to military readiness than the short-term instability created by removing senior officers.
A military organisation subjected to repeated high-level investigations may become increasingly cautious. Officers may prioritise political conformity and personal security over professional initiative. Decision-making can become more centralised precisely at a time when modern warfare demands decentralised judgement, flexibility and rapid adaptation.
This is the deeper contradiction confronting Xi’s military reforms. The more tightly political authority is concentrated, the greater the possibility that professional autonomy becomes constrained. But without a sufficient degree of professional confidence and initiative, centralisation alone cannot produce an effective fighting force.
The removal of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli should therefore not be interpreted through the simplistic binary of either Xi is losing control or Xi is consolidating power. Both interpretations capture part of the reality.
Xi clearly possesses the political authority to remove even the most senior officers in the Chinese military establishment. The latest development reinforces the principle that no commander, regardless of rank or proximity to power, is beyond the reach of Party discipline.
The central challenge facing China’s leadership is no longer simply identifying corrupt or politically unreliable generals. It is whether Xi can rebuild a military leadership that remains firmly subordinate to the Party while also possessing the professional competence, institutional confidence and operational experience required for modern warfare. Xi has shown that he can remove generals. The more consequential test is whether he can build a military that can function effectively after so many of them have gone.
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