~ Linn Maung ~
On 1 July 2026, China formally brought into force its Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, a landmark piece of legislation that Beijing describes as an important step towards strengthening national cohesion and advancing the country’s long-term development. While the law has attracted criticism abroad for its perceived assimilationist undertones, its significance extends beyond the debate over minority rights. More fundamentally, it represents the legal codification of a profound shift in how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) understands ethnicity, national identity and state-building in the Xi Jinping era.
China officially recognises 56 ethnic groups, the Han majority, which constitutes over 91 per cent of the country’s 1.4 billion people, and 55 ethnic minority groups comprising roughly 125 million citizens. Although minorities account for less than one-tenth of China’s population, they inhabit more than 60 per cent of the country’s landmass, including strategically significant frontier regions such as Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi and Ningxia. Managing ethnic diversity has therefore never been merely a social policy challenge; it has remained deeply intertwined with questions of territorial integrity, national security and political stability.
At first glance, the new legislation may appear as uncontroversial. It speaks of promoting equality among ethnic groups, opposing discrimination, protecting lawful rights and encouraging economic development in minority regions. It also reiterates commitments to preserving cultural heritage and traditional customs. These principles are broadly consistent with China’s constitutional provisions and the country’s long-standing narrative that all ethnic groups together constitute a unified multi-ethnic nation.
Unlike previous legislation that centred on ethnic autonomy and differentiated governance, the new law repeatedly emphasises the need to forge a “strong sense of community for the Chinese nation”. This phrase, frequently invoked by Xi Jinping over the past decade, has become the organising principle of China’s contemporary ethnic policy. The law requires state institutions, schools, religious organisations, businesses and even social organisations to actively cultivate identification with the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the Communist Party and socialism with Chinese characteristics.
This marks an important departure from the framework that characterised much of the reform era. For decades, China’s ethnic governance rested upon the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law of 1984, which formally recognised the distinctiveness of minority nationalities while granting varying degrees of administrative autonomy in designated regions. Although implementation often fell short of these legal aspirations, the underlying philosophy accepted that ethnic diversity could coexist alongside national unity.
The new legislation appears to reorder those priorities. Rather than beginning with diversity and seeking unity, it begins with unity and expects diversity to operate within that overarching national identity.
Chinese policymakers frequently point to ethnic conflicts elsewhere, the collapse of the Soviet Union and episodes of separatist violence in Xinjiang as evidence that fragmented national identities pose long-term security risks. From this perspective, promoting Mandarin in education, encouraging inter-ethnic exchanges and strengthening patriotic education are viewed as policies comparable to nation-building initiatives adopted by many multi-ethnic states.
The counterargument, however, is not that national integration is inherently problematic. Rather, critics question whether integration under the new framework leaves adequate space for minority identities to flourish on their own terms.
The law also assigns responsibility for promoting ethnic unity to virtually every level of society, from government departments and neighbourhood committees to enterprises, religious institutions and the armed forces. In many ways it transforms ethnic policy from a specialised administrative domain into a nationwide political responsibility. Perhaps most unusually, the legislation also contains provisions allowing China to pursue legal action against foreign organisations or individuals deemed to undermine ethnic unity, signalling an increasingly expansive interpretation of sovereignty that extends beyond China’s borders.
Whether these provisions are actively enforced remains to be seen. Nevertheless, they illustrate how closely questions of ethnic identity have become linked with broader concerns surrounding national security and ideological governance.
Ethnic minority regions occupy some of the country’s most strategically important frontiers, bordering India, Russia, Mongolia, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. They are also central to China’s energy security, border governance and major connectivity initiatives. How Beijing balances integration with cultural diversity will therefore influence not only domestic governance but also regional perceptions of China’s rise and its approach towards managing diversity within an increasingly assertive state.
Ultimately, China’s new Ethnic Unity Law should not be viewed simply as another legislative instrument. It is better understood as a constitutional expression of Xi Jinping’s broader political vision, one in which national unity increasingly takes precedence over differentiated autonomy, and where the state seeks to cultivate a single political identity that transcends ethnic distinctions.
Whether this approach succeeds in strengthening cohesion or instead generates new tensions over identity will become evident only over time. What is already clear, however, is that the debate surrounding China’s ethnic policy is no longer centred on autonomy alone. It is increasingly about how a modern nation-state defines belonging and how much diversity it is prepared to accommodate within that definition.
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